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Abstract
In this paper we update the traditional insurance economics framework to incorporate key
features of the credit default swap (CDS) market. First, we allow for insurer insolvency, with
asymmetric information as to its probability. We nd that stable insurers become less stable because
they are forced to compete on price. When insurer type is known, increased competition among
insurers can create instability for the same reason. Second, we allow the insured party to have
heterogeneous motivations for purchasing CDS. For example, some may own the underlying asset
and purchase CDS for risk management, while others buy these contracts purely for speculation.
We show that speculators will choose to contract with less stable insurers, resulting in higher
counterparty risk in this market relative to that of traditional insurance; however, a regulatory
policy that disallows speculative trading can, perversely, cause market counterparty risk to increase.
Third, we relax the standard assumption of contract exclusivity, which does not apply to the CDS
market, by allowing the insured to purchase contracts from many insurers. In contrast to the
traditional insurance model, we show that separation of risk type among insured parties can be
achieved through insurer choice. We use our model to shed light on the debate over Central
Counterparties (CCP). We show that requiring CDS contracts to be negotiated through CCPs can
push stable insurers out of the market, mitigating the benet of risk pooling.
We are grateful to Philip Bond, Neil Brisley, Alex Edmans, Mike Hoy, Thor Koeppl, Af Mirza, Jano Zabojnik
and seminar participants at the University of Toronto, Bank of Canada, 2011 Risk Theory Society, 2010 CEA and
University of Alberta for helpful comments.1 Introduction
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) have received considerable media attention since the beginning of
the credit crisis in 2007.1 There was public outrage over the use of U.S. tax payer money to pay
(in full) the CDS claims that sellers, such as AIG, had sold to many major banks. In response to
this and other episodes, policy-makers have been under pressure to implement regulatory reforms.
For example, in 2008 the State of New York tabled legislation to have CDS sellers classied and
regulated as insurers.2 However, it is not clear whether sellers are an insurance provider, or simply
a party to a derivative contract as in any other options market. While these issues are of widespread
interest, the discourse on CDS is lacking in theoretical perspective. Our analysis provides a simple
framework which elucidates key dierences between these contracts and traditional insurance, and
the consequences of these dierences on market outcomes.
This paper updates the traditional insurance economics framework to account for features
unique to the CDS market. We capture the pervasiveness of insurer instability by allowing for
the possibility that sellers of CDS contracts become insolvent. We then incorporate three features
into a standard model of insurance: First, we introduce privately observed heterogeneity of insurer
quality to capture the opacity of the CDS market. With large sellers such as Ambac, MBIA and
AIG suddenly and repeatedly downgraded by rating agencies, it would seem prudent to allow for
this feature. Second, we consider insured parties who can dier on their motivation to insure. In
particular, unlike traditional insurance markets, the CDS market is characterized by buyers who
may or may not own the underlying risk. Furthermore, the number of buyers that use CDS purely
for speculative purposes is roughly equal to those who use them for risk management (Fitch 2009,
2010). Finally, we allow an insured party to purchase protection on the same risk from multiple
insurers. Similar to the market for life insurance, where an insured party can purchase policies
from multiple insurers, there are few if any actions that a CDS seller can take to prevent the buyer
from purchasing more protection elsewhere. We then apply the model to analyze the consequences
of creating a central counterparty. This is a particularly relevant issue given the Dodd-Frank bill
in the U.S., which requires a large portion of CDS trades to go through clearinghouses.3
We nd that unstable insurers (i.e., those who are more likely to fail) can exist in equilibrium:
either they are able to oer a suciently discounted price for the protection the provide, or they
are able to camou
age themselves in an opaque market. We show that insurer specic and market
counterparty risk (which is dened as the expected probability of insurer default) can endogenously
1In a credit default swap, an insurer agrees to cover the losses of the insured if pre-dened credit events (e.g.,
default) happen to some debt instrument. In exchange, the insured agrees to pay an ongoing premium at xed
intervals for the life of the contract. A CDS written on the debt of a single company is typically bought and sold
through a dealer. When the underlying debt is more complicated (and so requires a non-standard contract), the CDS
is completed directly between the two parties. For example, the CDS contracts that destabilized AIG were mainly
direct contracts with major banks, written on complex mortgage related securities. The estimated notional size of
the CDS market in 1998 was 180 billion dollars, by 2004 this number had grown to 6 trillion, and by the end of 2008
it was 41 trillion dollars (Stulz 2009). Note that this is a notional amount and no doubt overestimates the absolute
economic value of all contracts, but the relative growth has been rapid.
2http://ins.state.ny.us/circltr/2008/cl08 19.htm
3Europe appears to be moving in a similar direction with the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR).
1increase as competition increases among insurers, or when insurer quality is unknown. In addition,
we show that when the proportion of buyers that use CDS for trading purposes increases, relative
to those using them for risk management, more contracts will be written with unstable insurers.
However, removing speculators from the market can decrease, or perversely increase market coun-
terparty risk, depending on the nature of competition between insurers. When insured parties can
dier according to their privately known risk type, we show that they may choose to separate on
the choice of insurer, even when they can divide their contract among as many insurers as they
wish. This is in contrast to a standard result in traditional insurance economics, which proposes
that when insurers cannot preclude insured parties from purchasing insurance elsewhere, separation
through a market mechanism cannot be achieved.4 This separation however, does not occur when
contracts must 
ow through a central counterparty (CCP). More importantly, we show that a CCP
can force stable insurers out of the market.
The intuition behind our results is as follows. The insured party can choose to contract with a
stable (`good') insurer, or with an unstable (`bad') insurer. The choice of insurer boils down to a
tradeo between the price (premium) and the degree of exposure to counterparty risk (probability
of insurer insolvency). In our model, the bad insurer makes an investment that earns high returns
but is illiquid and so cannot be used to help pay claims. The good insurer makes an investment
that earns a lower return, but is a liquid asset, and so can improve its chances of being solvent
when a claim is made. We assume that the return on the bad insurer's investment is suciently
high that they are able to charge lower premia than the good insurer. In Section 3, we show that
the resulting equilibrium can have good or bad insurers dominate the market. When the insured
party is suciently averse to counterparty risk, the bad insurer will not be able to cut its premium
enough to attract the insured party. In this case, only the good insurer exists, and it can extract
positive prots. When the insured party has little aversion to counterparty risk, the bad insurer
will control the market as insured parties become premium driven, rather than counterparty risk
driven. In Section 3.2, we show that as insurer competition increases, the good insurer may be
forced to compete on premium against new entrants, driving prots down and counterparty risk up.
This result is similar in spirit to the banking literature that shows that when competition among
banks increases, stability of the system can decrease. One mechanism that drives this result is a
bank taking on a riskier portfolio as competition increases (see Boyd and De Nicol o (2005) or Vives
(2010) for a summary of this literature). In contrast, our insurer's investment selection may remain
the same, however competition gives them less resources to invest. Returning to the case of two
insurers, we show in Section 3.3 how the equilibrium changes when the insured party does not know
the insurer's quality. In particular, the good insurer can no longer drive out the bad insurer. This is
because the bad insurer can simply charge the same premium as the good insurer and the insured
cannot distinguish between the two. Competition between insurers then drives the equilibrium
premium down to where the good insurer earns zero prot, thereby increasing counterparty risk.
4One exception is Rothschild (2009), who uses insurance on multiple contingencies to achieve separation. In
contrast, we achieve separation with only one contingency (default), as is the usual assumption in the insurance
economics literature.
2In Section 4, we let there be insured parties who dier only on their aversion to counterparty
risk, which we associate with having dierent motivations for using CDS. Recall that the two key
factors in the choice of insurer are counterparty risk and premium. Those insured parties who use
CDS purely for trading purposes, and perhaps do not even own the underlying asset (i.e., have no
insurable interest), are more likely premium driven. On the other hand, buyers who use CDS for risk
management would internalize the counterparty risk more, and would be willing to pay relatively
more for stable protection. Traditional insurance markets are usually viewed as having risk averse
insured parties. The analogue to CDS would be a market composed entirely of buyers using the
contracts for risk management purposes. As more participants use CDS purely for speculation, we
nd that the market will be serviced more by unstable insurers. This is because the speculators
prefer the lower premium that unstable insurers can oer. Simply removing speculators from the
market may not solve the problem. Although such a policy can reduce the number of unstable
insurers in the market, it can also have the perverse eect of making the otherwise stable insurers
riskier. This is because removing buyers from the market creates more competition among the
sellers. As in the competition result described above, this can drive down premia and increase
counterparty risk.
In Section 5, we extend the model to allow for heterogeneity in the risk of insured parties
(i.e., the risk of the underlying asset), as is standard in the insurance economics literature. We
characterize an equilibrium in which the choice of insurer can separate the insured party types.
Specically, a relatively safe insured party contracts with a bad insurer to economize on premiums
paid, whereas a riskier insured party contracts with a good insurer, at a higher premium, for fear
of counterparty risk. In Appendix B, we show that this result is robust to a relaxation of the
assumption of exclusivity, i.e., it holds even when insured parties can contract with more than one
insurer. We permit a large number of insurers, split between good and bad types. Further, we
assume that both insurer types are subject to idiosyncratic default risk; however, bad insurers are
also subject to aggregate risk, such as an extreme market downturn that aects all these insurers at
once. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which the safe insured party divides its contract
over all of the bad insurers, whereas the risky insured party divides over the good insurers. The
intuition for this result is the same for the two insurer case described above. The nature of the
aggregate risk allows us to achieve separation without the assumption of exclusivity, because the
safety of good insurers cannot be replicated by bad ones.
Finally, in Section 6 we consider the consequences of a central counterparty. A CCP acts as the
buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. Participants in this market contribute to a fund
designed to shelter each other from counterparty risk. Pirrong (2009) reports that few CCPs penal-
ize sellers based on their counterparty risk. Given that the counterparty risk to which an insured
party is exposed is now that of the entire pool of insurers (through co-insurance), dierential premia
based on insurer quality are not feasible. We consider the case in which there are a large number
of insured parties and insurers. Given a CCP arrangement, counterparty risk is eectively pooled
so that non-failing participants can absorb the losses of the failed ones. Therefore, insuring with a
3good insurer has little eect on the exposure of the insured to counterparty risk. Consequently, the
insured party will contract with the bad insurer to obtain a better premium. Thus, the separating
equilibrium described above ceases to exist. More importantly, insured parties will choose to insure
solely with bad insurers so that in equilibrium, good insurers are pushed out of the market. This
occurs because each individual insured party does not internalize the amount that their contract
adds to the pooled counterparty risk, yielding an outcome similar in spirit to the problem of the
commons. It is interesting to note that in this case, central organization is the cause and not the
cure for this outcome. This result can also be interpreted as an example of the Lucas Critique, in
that policy makers implementing a CCP should consider the reaction of market participants.
Literature Review
This paper contributes to the literature on counterparty risk, credit default swaps and insurance.
Thompson (2010) considers a case with endogenous counterparty risk in nancial insurance. It is
shown that an insurer has a moral hazard problem and may not invest in the best interest of the
insured party. Furthermore, it is shown that truthful revelation of insured type can be attained
because revelation aects the investment decision of the insurer, and consequently, the counterparty
risk to which the insured is exposed. In contrast to this paper, we explicitly model multiple insurers
and so can analyze the composition of insurers in the market. In another related paper, Acharya
and Bisin (2010) show that due to the opacity of over-the-counter markets (where many CDS trade),
counterparty risk can occur because insurers may take positions which increase their likelihood of
default. In contrast, we model a situation in which insurers have varying degrees of stability and
show that, regardless of whether CDS markets are opaque, unstable insurance can be a feature of
the equilibrium. Neither Thompson (2010) nor Acharya and Bisin (2010) analyze the aects of
competition among insurers, the motivation to purchase CDS, the aects of mutual exclusion of
contracts, or the commons problem that arises with a CCP, as is done in this paper.
In the insurance economics literature, Ligon and Thistle (2009) provide a model in which mutual
and stock insurers can co-exist. They show that mutual insurers may exist as a means for low-risk
individuals to separate themselves. This parallels one of our results, wherein unstable insurers may
exist to separate the market. Separation exists in their model because low-risk individuals can
form a suciently small mutual wherein lower expected coverage relative to a stock insurer keeps
the high-risk individuals out. In contrast, we consider two stock insurers with dierent levels of
counterparty risk. Cummins and Mahul (2003) determine the optimal indemnity (contract size) in
the case where the insurer and insured party have dierent beliefs about the probability that the
insurer will fail. In contrast, we assume that the insurer has better information about its portfolio
and so an asymmetric information problem arises. Further, the analysis of optimal indemnity is
not relevant in our context due to the inability of insured parties in the CDS market to separate
on ex-ante contract size (due to the non-exclusivity of contracts).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 considers the case when
4insurers are known, when there is increased competition among them, and when they are unknown.
Section 4 allows insured parties to dier based on their motivation to purchase CDS. Section 5
analyzes the case in which there are multiple insurers, and in which the risk that is being insured
is unknown to those insurers. Section 6 explores the consequences of a central counterparty and
Section 7 concludes. Robustness Section 8 provides a discussion of a number of our assumptions
and nontrivial proofs can be found in Appendix A.
2 Model: CDS as insurance
This section describes the market for insurance and its participants. The purchaser, whom we
refer to as a bank, owns a risky asset which it wishes to insure. We refer to this asset as a loan.
We will not model anything unique to a bank, however as banks are the largest purchasers of these
types of contracts, we use this terminology for ease of exposition. The providers of insurance are
simply referred to as insurers.
2.1 Banks
The fundamental characteristic of a bank is the desire to reduce risk. As in Thompson (2010),
if the bank incurs a loss and has not insured this risk, it suers the cost Z  0.5 If the bank has a
loss for which it is insured, but the insurer cannot pay, it also suers the cost Z. This cost could
represent a regulatory penalty for exceeding some risk level, or an endogenous reaction to a shock
to the bank's portfolio; however, we will not model this here. It is this cost that makes the bank
averse to holding risk.
The bank's loan yields return RB with probability p, otherwise it defaults with probability 1 p
and returns nothing. The size of the loan is normalized to 1 and we assume that the bank must
insure the full loan.6 Therefore, in the event of a claim that is fullled, the bank will receive 1. In
the event that a claim cannot be fullled, the bank is penalized Z. Denoting the premium (price)
as P, and the probability that the insurer is solvent as q, the bank's expected payo is
pRB + (1   p)q   (1   p)(1   q)Z   P: (1)
Note that in the event of a claim, the insurer fails with probability 1   q and for simplicity, pays
5See robustness Section 8.2 for a more formal discussion about Z.
6This is done for simplicity. One could imagine that the bank chooses dierent amounts of insurance depending on
the insurer type (note that dierent insurer types will be discussed in the next subsection). An endogenous contract
size will not aect the qualitative results to be presented. Note also that we are ignoring a potential moral hazard,
wherein the bank may lose the incentive to monitor its loan when it completely insures. We assume full insurance
for simplicity, but all the results of the paper would go through if we assumed the bank insured only a fraction of its
loan. That fraction could then be set such that moral hazard is eliminated. Even in the presence of a moral hazard
problem, the only dierence in our model would be that either p would decrease, RB would decrease, or both. The
insurer would simply alter its beliefs about the expected cost of a claim and the results of the model would follow
through. For a more formal treatment of this moral hazard problem, see Bolton and Oehmke (2010), Parlour and
Winton (2009) or Thompson (2007).
5nothing to the bank.7 In other words, the bank is never fully insured against the loss provided
q < 1.
2.2 Insurers
We allow for the possibility of insurer insolvency (with probability 1   q), which we refer to as
counterparty risk. Importantly, we allow the probability of insurer insolvency to be heterogeneous
across insurers. This represents our rst departure from the literature. We model this heterogeneity
by considering two insurance providers, one relatively stable and the other unstable, referred to
simply as \(G)ood" and \(B)ad" insurers.
Both insurers have an exogenous portfolio of assets represented by , that pays o at t = 1. The
portfolio consists of a draw from the distribution function F(), in which  2 [;] and  < 0 < .
If an insurer does not sell an insurance contract, it is assumed to fail when its portfolio draw is
between [;0]. When it sells an insurance contract, the good insurer invests the premium it receives
in a risk-free asset with return normalized to one, which is available at t = 1. The bad insurer
invests in a more protable, but illiquid asset which has a rate of return r > 1, and is received at
t = 2. In other words, the bad insurer makes an investment that has no pledgable value at t = 1.8
Insurer j 2 fG;Bg, forms a belief bj corresponding to the probability that a claim will not be made
(when the underlying loan does not default). In our discussion thus far, we have assumed that
there is only one type of bank, therefore the beliefs are bG = bB = p. In Section 5, we allow for
heterogeneity across bank types, and so beliefs will be less trivial. Denoting the premium charged
by insurer j by Pj, we write the payo function for each insurer when they insure a loan of size 1.
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Examining the limits of integration in the second terms of expressions (2) and (3), we can charac-
terize the counterparty risk for each insurer. The probability that the good or bad insurer is solvent
when a claim is made, is given by qG = 1 F(1 PG) and qB = 1 F(1) respectively. Importantly,
note that the bad insurer's probability of default is independent of the premium. This is not the
case with the good insurer, since the probability of defaulting on a claim depends on the premium
PG. It is straightforward to see that if the premium increases, counterparty risk decreases for the
good insurer, but remains constant for the bad insurer. This occurs because the good insurer uses
the premium to improve the chances of solvency at t = 1, whereas the premium has no eect on
7A zero recovery value is assumed for simplicity and could be relaxed without changing the results.
8Note that for simplicity, we are implicitly assuming that insurers invest in dierent assets for reasons outside
the model. In Robustness Section 8.1, we detail how the model could be modied to allow the investment decision
to be endogenous.
6the bad insurer's chances of being solvent at t = 1. It follows that qG > qB whenever the premium
is positive.
In the following lemma, we characterize a property of the premia which we use throughout the
paper. First, dene the zero prot premia P0
G and P0
B, as the premium for which the good and bad
insurer earn zero prot from selling a contract respectively.
Lemma 1 There exists a return r; such that for all r > r, P0
G > P0
B.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The bad insurer invests the premium it receives from the insurance contract in an illiquid asset
and earns a return r. It follows that if r increases, it would require a lower premium to attain the
same expected payo. For the remainder of the paper we assume that r > r so that P0
G > P0
B. In
other words, the bad insurer is able to oer lower premia due to its favorable investment opportunity.
If this were not true, the good insurer could oer the bank a lower premium and lower counterparty
risk; trivially excluding the bad insurer from the market.
2.3 Timing
There are three time periods, in which we assume there is no discounting. At t = 0, an insurance
contract is written by an insurer on a risky loan owned by the bank. At t = 1, the uncertainty
about the insured loan and the insurer's portfolio is resolved. In this period, a claim is made if
the loan defaults. The insurer either fulls the claim if it is solvent, otherwise it fails and returns
nothing to the bank. At t = 2, the payo to the two period insurer investment is received. Figure
1 summarizes.
t =0 t =1 t =2
If needed, each insurer either pays
the claim or defaults.
Portfolio draw and liquid invest-
ment for insurer realized. Insur-
ance claim can be made.
Illiquid asset pays
o  for insurer
Bank endowed and
insures loan of size 1
Figure 1: Timing of the Model
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Insurer type known
We begin by assuming that the bank can identify the insurer type. There are two outcomes
in this simple insurance market. Either the good or the bad insurer dominates the market, and
7provides insurance for the bank.9 Modifying expression (1), we give the bank's payo function
when insuring with insurer type j.
(j) = pRB + (1   p)qj   (1   p)(1   qj)Z   Pj (4)
We assume without loss of generality that a bank which is indierent between contracting with a
good and bad insurer opts for the former. Therefore, the good insurer will dominate the market
when (G)  (B). Similarly, the bad insurer will dominate the market when (B) > (G).10
The following lemma summarizes these equilibria.
Lemma 2 There exist two equilibria in the market for insurance described above, which are char-
acterized as follows:
i. The good insurer provides insurance when
(1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qB)  P0
G   P0
B; (5)
where the equilibrium premium is P
G = (1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) + P0
B  P0
G.
ii. The bad insurer provides insurance when
(1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) < P0
G   P0
B; (6)
where the equilibrium premium is P
B = P0
G   (1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qB)     P0
B, for  small.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The good insurer will dominate the market when the benet of reduced counterparty risk, the
left hand side of expression (5), more than compensates for the additional premia that the banks
must pay, the right hand side of expression (5). It is straightforward to see that this will be true for
large values of Z. Conversely, the bad insurer dominates the market when the premium discount it
can oer exceeds the cost of the additional counterparty risk it poses to the banks. Regardless of
which insurer dominates, premia are set just low enough to force the competitor out of the market
and yield weakly positive prots to the remaining insurer.
In the remainder of this section, we describe forces which change the features of the equilibrium
described above, with a focus on stability (measured by the probability of insurer default). Lemma
2 outlines two possible benchmarks from which this analysis could proceed. Presumably, the most
interesting cases are those in which the counterparty risk posed by insurers increases. As we wish
9Note that we are implicitly assuming that the bank does not split its contract over the two insurers. Allowing this
would only complicate the analysis and would not change our qualitative results. One can imagine a transaction cost
which induces this behavior. Alternatively, a straightforward restriction on the parameter space will also accomplish
this. We explore the possibility of diversication by splitting the contract over many insurers in Section 5.
10Note that we are implicitly assuming that the bank chooses to purchase insurance (the bank's participation
constraint is slack). The participation constraint discussed in Robustness Section 8.2.
8to highlight this phenomena, we present the results of this section using the case where the good
insurer dominates (as per Lemma 2) as a benchmark; however, we will discuss the results in the
alternative case where the bad insurer initially dominates the market.
3.2 Competition
We now analyze how competition aects the equilibrium outlined previously. In addition to the
good and bad insurers, let us consider an insurer type j = M (middle), which has the same initial
portfolio. Assume that this insurer invests half of its premia in the liquid asset, and half in the


























It follows that in the event of a claim, the probability of solvency of insurer type M is given by
qM = 1   F(1   1




B, so that the zero prot premium of the middle type is between that of the good
and bad insurers. Consider the case in which expression (5) holds so that the bank chooses to
insure with the good over the bad insurer. We dene market counterparty risk as the expected
counterparty risk to which the bank is exposed. The following proposition shows that market
counterparty risk weakly increases as competition increases.
Proposition 1 When the good insurer dominates the market (as per Lemma 2), increased com-
petition causes market counterparty risk to increase. This occurs regardless of which one of two
possible equilibria arise. In the rst case, the good insurer continues to dominate, which occurs
when
(1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qM)  P0
G   P0
M; (8)
where the equilibrium premium is P
G = (1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qM) + P0
M  P0
G. Alternatively, the
middle insurer may dominate, which occurs when
(1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qM) < P0
G   P0
M; (9)
where the equilibrium premium is P
M = P0
G   (1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qM)     P0
M, for  small.
These equilibria can be shown to exist in the same way as outlined in the proof of Lemma 2.
To gain the intuition behind this result, we consider both situations described in the proposition.
Initially, the good insurer provides coverage as described in Lemma 2. Thus the premium and
associated counterparty risk are implied by the equality of (5), which we denote c PG and c qG =
91 F(1  c PG). First, consider the situation in which the good insurer continues to dominate when
another competitor is introduced. Dene the equilibrium premium charged by the good insurer
when the middle insurer is introduced by f PG, which in turn denes f qG = 1   F(1   f PG). The
premium and counterparty risk in this case are dened by the equality of (8). Contrasting this
with the equilibrium with no middle insurer, it follows that c PG  f PG. In other words, the new
competitor forces the good insurer to lower its premium, which results in an increase in counterparty
risk since c qG  f qG. Alternatively, the new competitor may take the market, which occurs when (9)
is satised. Since qM < qG, market counterparty risk is always higher in this case.11
We can also consider the case when the bad insurer dominates the good insurer initially (ex-
pression (6) is satised). When this occurs, there will be two possible outcomes when the middle
insurer is added. First, the bad insurer dominates the middle insurer and counterparty risk remains
unchanged. Although the middle insurer may force the bad insurer to cut its premium, recall that
1   qB = F(1), so that the risk of insolvency of the bad insurer is independent of the premium.
In the second case, the middle insurer will dominate the bad insurer and market counterparty risk
will decrease.
3.3 Unknown Insurer
We now return to the case of two insurers (good and bad) and consider the consequences of
asymmetric information regarding the quality of the insurance provider. In Section 3.1, the good
insurer can dominate with perfect information. With asymmetric information regarding insurer
type, the bad insurer can simply oer a contract with the same premium as the good insurer and
no information would be revealed. Conversely, the bad insurer will be revealed if it sets PB < P0
G,
since the good insurer would never oer a contract that earns negative prot. The following
proposition characterizes the impact of this informational asymmetry on market counterparty risk.
Proposition 2 When the good insurer dominates under perfect information (as per Lemma 2),
market counterparty risk as well as the individual counterparty risk of the good insurer will increase
when insurer type is unknown.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. When the insurer type is known and the good
insurer dominates, it charges the highest premium such that the bank still prefers to insure with
it rather than the bad insurer (who charges the lowest premium it can). When the insurer type
is unknown, the good insurer is forced to cut its premium or else give up the entire market to the
bad insurer who can undercut it and still not reveal itself. In equilibrium, the premium charged by
both insurers is P0
G. Since the good insurer (weakly) reduces its premium and 1 qG = F(1 PG),
11Note that the form of competition is not vital to Proposition 1. Alternatively, we could assume that increased
competition comes in the form of additional insurers of the same type (i.e., good and bad types). With two insurers
of the same type, the premium is driven down to that which earns zero prot  a la Bertrand competition. Since
counterparty risk of the good insurer increases as the premium decreases, the result follows.
10it follows that the good insurer becomes individually less stable. Furthermore, bad insurers now
participate in the market, so that market counterparty risk unambiguously increases.
When the bad insurer dominates under perfect information, there are two equilibria that can
arise when insurer type is unknown (a straightforward condition would determine which one prevails
in equilibrium). First, the bad insurer may choose to reveal itself by setting P
B < P0
G and dominate
the market. The bad insurer does this to obtain the insurance contract with certainty, rather than
charging P0
G and allowing the good insurer to stay in the market, thereby reducing its chances
it will obtain the contract. Since the counterparty risk of the bad insurer is independent of the
premium (1   qB = F(1)), if it chooses to reveal itself and take the market, market counterparty
risk remains unchanged. Conversely, when the bad insurer prefers the higher premium P0
G over
obtaining the contract with certainty, the presence of the good insurer causes market counterparty
risk to fall since the expected counterparty risk to which the bank is exposed decreases.
4 Incentives to Insure
A fundamental dierence between a standard insurance market and that for CDS are the incen-
tives for purchasing these types of contracts. For example, some buyers may own the underlying
loan being insured, while others do not. More generally, some participants may use CDS entirely for
trading purposes, while others may use them for risk management purposes. Fitch (2009, 2010) use
surveys to gauge the motivation of global banks to use credit derivatives (of which CDS represents
more than 90% (Fitch 2010)). They nd that hedging/credit risk management and speculation are
the two most common reasons to use credit derivatives (with similar prevalence).
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been a paper which analyzes the impact of buyer's
incentives on the market for CDS. We can do this simply in our model, as the incentive to purchase
insurance is captured by Z. One would expect that those who purchase CDS for risk management
purposes will view counterparty risk dierently than those who purchase it for speculation (i.e.,
speculators will internalize the cost of counterparty risk less). Further, although it does not directly
follow that those who purchase CDS for risk management will own the underlying loan, it is
reasonable to expect that those who do not own the underlying loan are more likely to purchase
CDS for speculation than for risk management. This has interesting consequences for policies aimed
at increasing stability, since ownership of the underlying loan can be easily observed. Consider
Germany's recent ban on the practice of buying CDS without owning the underlying risk, and
China's intent on creating a CDS market with this same restriction.12
Modifying the base model from Sections 2 and 3, we create a market for CDS as simply as
possible. In addition to the good and bad insurers, we let there be two types of banks who dier
on Z, which we denote ZL and ZH (to be dened below). For simplicity, we assume that a bank
insures with its own insurer, and that the size of each contract is one. At the end of the section, we
12http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-13/china-plans-to-introduce-credit-default-swaps-by-year-end-
ocial-says.html, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/germany-bans-naked-shorts-and-c-d-s-s/
11discuss how our results obtain when the model is enriched. The following lemma nds the value of
Z for which a bank is indierent between insuring with a good or bad insurer.
Lemma 3 Dene ^ Z as the level of Z for which the bank is indierent between insuring with the
good or bad insurer at the zero prot premium for each insurer. Thus, with P0
G and P0
B, a bank
with Z < ^ Z will prefer to contract with the bad insurer and a bank for which Z > ^ Z will prefer the





Proof. See Appendix A.
We interpret ^ Z by considering the two relevant components of a contract from the perspective
of a bank: counterparty risk and premium. A bank trades o a higher premium against increased
counterparty risk in its choice of insurer. A bank for which Z < ^ Z is less averse to counterparty risk
and so insures with the bad insurer, as it is able to oer a lower premium than the good insurer.
A bank for which Z > ^ Z is suciently averse to counterparty risk to compensate for the increase
in premium at the good insurer. For the remainder of the section, let ZL < ^ Z and ZH > ^ Z.
Given the market for CDS we have introduced, we dene market counterparty risk as the average
counterparty risk to which banks are exposed. In light of Lemma 3, we can explore the dierence
between a market for CDS and that for traditional insurance in a relatively simple way. When
modeling a market for insurance, it is customary to assume that the insured party has exposure to
the underlying risk (i.e., has an insurable interest). An insured party is typically modeled as being
risk averse and so willing to pay a risk premium when purchasing insurance. As discussed above,
in the market for CDS, some buyers purchase protection purely for speculation. As the number of
speculators (i.e., ZL types) increases, so does the relative amount of insurance sold by bad insurers.
It is reasonable to assume that the CDS market has more speculators than a traditional insurance
market, so it follows that the market for CDS will tend to have lower quality sellers.
The existence of speculators and bad insurers implies that CDS markets are generally charac-
terized by higher market counterparty risk. Although this is a \mechanically" trivial consequence
of our framework, it adds a new element to the policy debate on the CDS market. Ideally, a policy
maker whose mandate is to reduce counterparty risk could simply remove bad insurers; however,
the quality of the counterparty is often not observable to the bank, so it is unlikely that it will be
observable to a regulator.13 A second-best alternative may be to remove the ZL banks from the
market, similar to the recent proposals described above which disallow CDS to be purchased by
those who do not own the underlying loan. Although it is possible that those who own the loan
could purchase CDS on speculation, it is more likely that this policy will reduce the number of
buyers for which Z = ZL more than it would for buyers with Z = ZH. We look at the extreme
case in which the ZL bank can be eliminated. For a policy maker concerned about counterparty
risk in CDS markets, we show that removing the bank which demands insurance from the bad
insurer, may reduce counterparty risk, but can actually increase it depending on the structure of
13For a discussion on this issue see Pirrong (2009).
12the market. We consider the following two polar cases of market competition.
Case 1: Bertrand competition within each insurer type.
Case 2: No Bertrand competition within each insurer type.
We can think of the rst case as having multiple insurers of the same type who are able to compete
in the market, while in the second case there is only one good and one bad insurer. The following
proposition characterizes the impact of removing the ZL bank from the market, where P
G and P
G
are dened as the good insurer's equilibrium premium before and after this is done.
Proposition 3 In case 1, a policy that removes ZL banks will decrease market counterparty risk. In
case 2, such a policy will make the good insurer riskier and consequently may increase or decrease
market counterparty risk. When 2F(1   P
G ) > F(1   P
G) + F(1), market counterparty risk
increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the rst case, the insurers are driven down to zero prot due to competition within types.
When the ZL banks are removed, the bad insurers cannot compete in the market and so drop out
(as per Lemma 3). The good insurers still face Bertrand competition and so prots are zero and
the risk of the good insurer remains unchanged. Thus, average counterparty risk in the market
falls since bad insurers drop out.
In the second case, the good (bad) insurer contracts with the ZH (ZL) bank as in case one;
however, there is no Bertrand competition before the ZL banks are removed. Therefore, both
insurers extract positive prots from the contracts. When the ZL bank is removed, the bad insurer
then competes with the good insurer for the remaining bank, thereby eroding prots for both
insurers. In equilibrium, the good insurer cuts its premium suciently to attract the remaining
bank and the bad insurer drops out of the market as in case one. Since its premium is forced
down due to competition, the good insurer becomes riskier. Whether the net aect on market
counterparty risk is negative or positive depends on how much the good insurer must cut its
premium. Market counterparty risk will increase when 2F(1   P
G ) > F(1   P
G) + F(1), where
1 > 1   P
G  1   P
G. Given the ordering of premia in equilibrium, it is clear that this can be
satised by any number of distribution functions F(). The proof of the proposition characterizes
this outcome using the example of the uniform distribution. It follows that policy makers must be
cognizant that eliminating some buyers from the market may drive premia down, working against
the reduction of counterparty risk that arises when bad insurers drop out.
Although we model the market for insurance in a simple way, our results survive when we
consider a more complex framework. If we allow for many banks and insurers, it will still follow
that ZL banks will prefer the bad insurers. As long as premia are not set at the zero prot level
(so that insurers have some market power) and there is some competition between insurer types,
13the impact of removing ZL type buyers from the market will have the same implications for market
counterparty risk. Essentially, such a policy amounts to a decrease in demand, which results in
increased competition for existing buyers and puts downward pressure on premia.
5 Separation and Mutual Exclusion
In their seminal papers, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) develop a framework
in which insurers can screen individuals through a menu of contracts. Screening provides the means
to deal with an asymmetric information problem facing providers, as unobservable insured party
risk types will reveal themselves through their choice of contract. Up to this point, we have not
considered risk heterogeneity among the purchasers of insurance (banks), so that the traditional
form of asymmetric information has not been analyzed. This section evaluates a similar outcome to
the separating equilibrium in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We do this by extending the analysis
to allow for multiple bank risk types, which cannot be directly observed by the insurer.
Before considering the existence of separating equilibria, we make note of a fundamental as-
sumption which is commonly made in models of insurance; that insured parties cannot purchase
insurance from more than one provider. Without this assumption, which is referred to as exclu-
sivity, separation of risk types through a market mechanism cannot generally be achieved.14 The
nature of CDS markets makes the exclusion assumption implausible, as it is not possible for a seller
to restrict a buyer from purchasing insurance elsewhere. For presentation purposes, we present the
results of this section under the assumption of exclusivity, as this provides the intuition with a
simple extension of our previous model. We conclude with a discussion of how our results obtain
without exclusivity. The interested reader can refer to Appendix B, where we formally analyze this
case.
We enrich the environment outlined in Section 3.1 to allow two types of loans that a bank can
insure; a safe type (S) and a risky type (R), both of size 1. We assume that the safe (risky) loan
succeeds with probability pS (pR), and the bank is privately endowed with one or the other with
equal probability. Further, we continue to assume that contracts are exclusive and that the bank
insures both loans completely, i.e., the contract size is 1 regardless of loan type. The analysis is
similar to that in Section 3.1, however we need to modify the beliefs that the insurers have about
the probability of a claim. Recall that insurer j 2 fG;Bg, forms a belief bj corresponding to the
probability that a claim will not be made (when the underlying loan does not default). We rewrite
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14For a further discussion of why a separating equilibrium will not generally exist with non-exclusivity in the
context of life insurance, see Hoy and Polborn (2000).
14These payos are akin to those described in equations (2) and (3). The dierence is that the
probability of a claim, which we previously referred to as p, is replaced with the insurer's beliefs
about the type of bank it has contracted with. Since bank types are unknown to insurers, we focus
our attention on Bayesian Nash Equilibria.
Analogous to Section 3.1, there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the good insurer dominates
the market and provides insurance for both safe and risky banks, and another in which the bad
insurer dominates and provides insurance for either bank type. Unlike Section 3.1, there exists a
separating equilibrium in which both insurers are active. In this case, the safe bank insures with the
bad insurer and the risky bank with the good insurer.15 Before characterizing such an equilibrium,
we rewrite the payo function for bank i 2 fS;Rg, when insuring with insurer type j as follows.
(i;j) = piRB + (1   pi)qj   (1   pi)(1   qj)Z   Pj (12)
Consider the rst case in which the good insurer dominates the market. This will occur when both
bank types prefer the good insurer, (S;G)  (S;B) and (R;G)  (R;B), with the former
being the binding condition. Similarly, we dene the case under which the bad insurer will dominate
the market. In this case, (S;B) > (S;G) and (R;B) > (R;G), where the latter is the binding
condition. The nal case in which the bank types separate occurs when (S;B) > (S;G) and
(R;G)  (R;B). The following lemma characterizes the set of equilibria in this market.16
Lemma 4 There are three equilibria in this market.
i. When Z is high, there exists an equilibrium in which the good insurer contracts with both safe
and risky banks at a single (pooling) premium.
ii. When Z is low, there exists an equilibrium in which the bad insurer contracts with both safe
and risky banks at a single (pooling) premium.
iii. For intermediate values of Z, there exists an equilibrium in which the banks separate wherein
the bad (good) insurer contracts with the safe (risky) bank.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When Z is high, both the safe and risky bank are highly averse to counterparty risk, and are
willing to pay more for the increased protection that the good insurer oers. When Z is low,
both the safe and risky banks care little about counterparty risk, and so insure with the bad
15In the proof to Lemma 4, the separating equilibrium where the good insurer contracts with the safe bank and
the bad insurer with the risky bank is ruled out.
16Lemma 4 characterizes two pooling equilibria which do not have an analogue in Rothschild and Stiglitz (RS)
(1976). In their screening model, the insurer is free to choose a menu of contracts, namely any contract size and
premium combination. In our model, counterparty risk plays the same role as contract size in RS (1976). To see this,
note that the dierence in counterparty risk between the good and bad insurer alters the expected coverage from an
ex-ante perspective, whereas changing the contract size in RS (1976) alters the actual level of coverage. It is because
insurers are 
exible in their choice of contract size in RS (1976) that pooling is never optimal. In our framework, the
level of counterparty risk is not a choice variable, so that pooling equilibria can be supported.
15insurer at a lower premium. A separating equilibrium exists when the risky bank is willing to pay
a higher premium and be revealed as risky, since it obtains lower counterparty risk at the good
insurer. Similarly, the safe bank reveals itself and pays a lower premium, however it suers higher
counterparty risk at the bad insurer. This equilibrium will arise when the safe bank is concerned
less about the risk of insurer default (due to its lower probability of making a claim), whereas the
risky bank is driven more by counterparty risk (due to its higher probability of making a claim).
In the proof of the lemma, we provide the formal conditions needed to establish existence, as well
as characterize the equilibrium premia.
In our previous discussion, which culminated in Lemma 4, we assumed that banks buy insurance
exclusively from one provider. As discussed above, this assumption is not appropriate in the CDS
market, as insurers cannot preclude banks from purchasing more protection elsewhere. Proposition
5 in Appendix B shows that a separating equilibrium, in which unobserved bank type is revealed,
can exist even when a bank can split its contract among many insurers. A formal argument requires
a more complicated model, which can be found in Appendix B, but the general intuition is fairly
simple. As long as the bank cannot replicate the insurance it receives through the good insurer,
by simply purchasing more insurance from the bad insurer, a separating equilibrium can exist. In
Appendix B, we consider a case with many good and bad insurers in which the latter are exposed
to aggregate risk, so that all may fail in some event. In other words, bad insurers eectively cannot
provide complete coverage. In this environment, either bank will divide insurance across providers
to reduce idiosyncratic default risk. In the separating equilibrium, the safe bank will contract solely
with bad insurers and bear the aggregate risk in exchange for a lower premium, while the risky bank
will contract solely with good insurers and pay a higher premium in exchange for more complete
protection.
6 Central Counterparties
In the wake of the credit crisis that began in 2007, law makers around the world have been
tabling regulations to move CDS from over-the-counter markets to a formal central counterparty
(CCP) arrangement.17 In the absence of a central counterparty, contracts are bilateral and take one
of two forms. First, and most commonly, contracts are negotiated through a dealer. In these types
of transactions, a buyer purchases protection from a counterparty located by a dealer. Second,
trading may be done without a dealer, where a buyer approaches a seller directly. In a CCP
arrangement, all transactions 
ow through a central counterparty which acts as the buyer to every
seller and the seller to every buyer. In this arrangement, participants provide capital and post
margins (collateral) that the CCP can use to cover default losses. Furthermore, the CCP can
require participants to make additional payments if needed to cover losses. Therefore, a CCP pools
default risk across participants (or members).18
17See Bliss and Steigerwald (2007) for an introduction to and discussion on CCPs.
18This can be contrasted with the analysis in Appendix B, which shows that a risk-averse (Z > 0) bank will
divide a contract across many insurers to reduce idiosyncratic risk of counterparty default. A CCP however, forces
16In our model, bad insurers are forced to set a lower premium because they pose a greater risk of
default (assuming insurer type is known). Arora et al. (2009) provide evidence that counterparty
risk is priced in CDS contracts, so that premia can vary depending on the quality of the seller.
Importantly, the CCP forces a single premium on the market because traders view counterparty
risk as being only that of the CCP. As discussed above, a CCP requires capital (for a default fund)
and collateral in case of contract non-performance. Typically, CCPs demand collateral according
to the quality of the asset being insured, but less so based on the quality of the counterparties
(Pirrong 2009). In what follows, we assume that the CCP is either unwilling or cannot condition
collateral or contributions to the default fund based on insurer quality.19
A comprehensive analysis of a CCP arrangement is beyond the scope of this paper, however
our framework can be used to address an issue that has been largely ignored in the debate thus
far. Assume there are many insurers of both types, that there is Bertrand competition within both
insurer types and that each insurer contracts with its own bank. Let there be N banks, who each
contract with one insurer. As in Section 4, banks may dier in their aversion to counterparty risk.
We assume that there are NG banks for which Z = ZH and NB banks for which Z = ZL, so that
N = NG+NB. When there is no CCP, Lemma 3 implies that in equilibrium ZH (ZL) banks insure
with good (bad) insurers, so that the number of good (bad) insurers in the market is NG (NB).
Furthermore, since there is Bertrand competition within insurer type, all premia are determined
by the zero prot conditions dened in Section 2.2.
We now analyze the imposition of a CCP on this market, which we conceptualize as a scheme
to pool the risk of insurer default. Mutualization requires each insurer to contribute to a pool of
funds that the CCP can use in the event of insurer failure. We denote the size of this pool by m.
The CCP will pay out claims as long as it is solvent, but fails if the number of insurers which have
defaulted on claims is too high. We assume collateral requirements are not insurer specic (and
the risk of a claim is the same with every bank), so for simplicity we normalize collateral to zero.
Since all contracts are of size 1, the CCP will default when m insurers who have been faced with
a claim have defaulted. The default risk of the CCP can be characterized as follows (note that
qB = 1   F(1) and qG = 1   F(1   P0
G)).
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This expression captures all the possible combinations for which m or more insurers default,
weighted by the probability of each outcome. To determine the optimal size of the default pool m
requires added structure which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, because our results are
the diversication of counterparty risk among all insurers, so that a bank that insures with one insurer receives the
diversication benet as if it were to contract with every insurer.
19In practice, CCPs can and sometimes do try to enforce higher capital charges (and higher collateral) to riskier
counterparties. The relevance of this assumption is discussed below, but we note that the results of this section will
survive provided that the CCP does not perfectly condition on counterparty quality.
17not dependent on the specic form of the CCP objective, we focus our attention on the simple case
in which every insurer must fail before the central counterparty fails. For example, this would be
true if the remaining solvent insurers could be forced to help cover all losses. Therefore, expression
(13) collapses to
1   qccp = (1   qG)NG(1   qB)NB: (14)
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium with a CCP and represents the main result
of this section.
Proposition 4 In the presence of a CCP, the bad insurers will dominate the market and push the
good insurers out when
(1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qB)(1   qG)NG 1(1   qB)NB < P0
G   P0
B; (15)
which is satised for large N.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result is best understood by comparing (15) to the case in which a bank chooses to contract
with a bad insurer in the absence of a CCP, given by (6), which we re-write here for convenience.
(1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) < P0
G   P0
B (16)
Comparing (15) and (16), it is straightforward to see that the additional counterparty risk to which
the bank is exposed from a bad insurer is smaller in the CCP case, since (1 qG)NG 1(1 qB)NB < 1.
With a CCP, the change in individual counterparty risk from switching to a bad insurer (the left
hand size of (15)) approaches zero as either NG ! 1, NB ! 1 or both. Thus, in a large market,
the good insurer presents no benet of reduced counterparty risk since the additional counterparty
risk that a single bank adds to the CCP by choosing a bad over a good insurer is negligible. Instead,
the insurers compete solely on premium. Given the assumption that r > r (see Lemma 1), the bad
insurer can oer a lower premium (P0
B < P0
G). Accordingly, the bad insurer will simply undercut
the good insurer and obtain the contract with the bank. No single bank would then wish to remain
at the good insurer, so that in equilibrium, only bad insurers are left in the market. This result is
similar in spirit to the classic problem of the commons. Although as a group, they may be worse
o for only insuring with bad insurers (through increased default risk of the CCP or an increase
in the capital charge/collateral requirement to oset the increased risk), a single bank does not
internalize the counterparty risk since it is individually too small.
As a straightforward corollary of the above proposition, we note that the existence of a CCP
with a large number of members eliminates the possibility of a separating equilibrium as discussed
in Section 5. Obviously, banks will not separate on insurer type when the counterparty risk to
which they are exposed is the same regardless of the insurer in which they contract.
18This result can be interpreted as an example of the Lucas critique, in that policy-makers con-
sidering the imposition of a CCP must consider the reaction of market participants to the policy.
The remedy to the problem is obvious: the CCP should penalize unstable insurers in this market.
Pirrong (2009) reports that this may not be possible since it is not clear whether CCPs can deduce
the quality of the insurer, especially if market participants cannot deduce the quality themselves.
Nonetheless, to mitigate the problem posed in Proposition 4, our analysis suggests that CCPs
should condition capital requirements and collateral on the quality of the counterparty. In this
way, the bad insurer would have a higher cost of participation in the market and thus may not be
able to undercut the premium of the good insurer.
A brief discussion about marking to market and counterparty risk is warranted. With daily mark
to market, the CDS seller would have to post additional collateral if the quality of the underlying
asset deteriorates. When the quality of the insurer falls at the same time as the underlying asset,
the increase in collateral will help mitigate the counterparty risk to which the buyer is exposed.
However, it could be that the underlying asset becomes safer at the same time as the insurer becomes
riskier. In this case, the decrease in collateral exacerbates the counterparty risk. Therefore, it is
clear that mark to market cannot eliminate the problem in Proposition 4.
The results from this section are meant to highlight a very specic point relevant to the debate
over CCPs. There are many factors that must be considered in determining whether such an
arrangement would be benecial to the market. For example, there is certainly a diversication
benet that comes with co-insurance which may outweigh the endogenously lower quality individual
insurance that we consider. Further, there are other possible benets such as netting that CCPs
can provide.20 A formal welfare analysis is left for future research.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we update the traditional insurance economics model to account for features
unique to the market for credit default swaps. We show that when the counterparty risk of the
insurer is unknown, unstable insurers can exist in equilibrium and otherwise stable insurers can
destabilize. Increased competition among insurers is also shown to potentially destabilize good
insurers. Further, we show that when some buyers of CDS use the instrument purely for speculation
(and potentially have no insurable interest), the market will be characterized by more unstable
insurers; however, removing these traders may cause market counterparty risk to increase. We
also analyze the case when contracts can be split over multiple providers. Contrary to standard
results in the insurance economics literature, we show that with counterparty risk (some of which
must be aggregate risk), the insured parties can separate based on the type of insurers with whom
they contract. Finally, we apply our analysis to the ongoing debate on central counterparties. We
show that in such an arrangement, the stable insurers can be driven out of the market due to their
inability to compete on premia.
20See Bliss and Steigerwald (2007).
198 Robustness
8.1 Insurer Investment Choice
We model heterogeneity between the two insurer types as simply as possible. Given that the two
insurers are identical before contracts are issued, there is an obvious question of why they would
invest in dierent assets. We recognize that investing in the liquid asset may not be credible for the
good insurer, given that it could earn a higher prot investing in the illiquid asset. This could easily
remedied by allowing heterogeneity along two dimensions. First, by making our insurers dierent
before contracting and second, by allowing the investment choice to be an optimal decision variable,
as in Thompson (2010). For example, instead of endowing both insurers with a portfolio draw from
F(), as is done in our paper, let the good (bad) insurer receive a draw from a distribution G()
(B()). Next, let the proportion that the good (bad) insurer invests in the liquid asset be given
by G (B), with the remainder invested in the illiquid asset. Each insurer can now solve for its
optimal investment decision given its portfolio distribution. Using the usual notation for premia,
counterparty risk is now dened in a similar way as in Section 2, 1   qG = G(1   
GPG) and
1   qB = B(1   
BPB), where the asterisk represents the optimal portfolio choice. We can then
impose the appropriate restrictions on the distribution functions to ensure qG(
G) > qB(
B), i.e.,
so that our bad insurer has higher counterparty risk.
What will drive the dierence in investment choice between the good and bad insurer is how
valuable the liquid asset is relative to the illiquid asset. As in expressions (2) and (3), the insurers
invest in the liquid asset to reduce the probability of insolvency in the state of the world when a
claim is made. Given the new distributions, the reduction in counterparty risk from investing in
the liquid asset for the good (bad) insurer is: G(1) G(1 
GPG) (B(1) B(1 
BPB)). Therefore,
the more mass that the distribution function has in this region, the higher the benet and the more
that will be invested in the liquid asset. We imagine that the bad insurer is endowed with a riskier
portfolio than the good insurer, in the sense that it has more mass on high and low outcomes (for
example, portfolio draws near  and ). Consequently, the bad insurer invests more in the illiquid
asset (and reaps higher returns) because investments in the liquid asset are unlikely to be sucient
for it to remain solvent in the event of a bad draw. Conversely, we imagine that the good insurer
has a portfolio with less risk so that bad portfolio draws are less extreme and can therefore be
oset by investing in the liquid asset. All of the results of the paper would then follow with the
new denition of counterparty risk.
8.2 Z and Risk Aversion
It is worthwhile to contrast the parameter Z in our model with standard utility assumptions
made in most insurance papers. Typically, a non-linear utility function is used for the insured
party that puts dierent weights/utility value on high and low outcomes. A standard risk averse
utility function will put relatively more negative weight on the bad outcomes (e.g., an `accident')
versus the high outcome (e.g., no `accident'). As such, insurance is purchased to protect the risk
20averse individual that may cost more than the expected loss from the accident. In our model, we
use the simplest formulation possible that captures insurance without a non-linear function. In
particular, we put a weight Z on the bad outcome (i.e., the loan fails). As such, the utility in the
good state (i.e., the loan does not fail) is simply equal to the monetary payo. In our model we
let Z 2 [0;1). To understand this range, we consider the condition under which a bank (with
probability of default 1-p) is indierent between purchasing and not purchasing insurance, i.e., its
participation constraint.
pRB + (1   p)q   (1   p)(1   q)Z   P = pRB   (1   p)Z
) P = (1   p)q(1 + Z) (17)
Therefore, when Z = 0, P = (1   p)q, which is the actuarially fair premium, i.e., the bank
pays the expected value of the coverage. This corresponds to the usual insurance result with a risk
neutral agent. When Z > 0, the bank is willing to pay greater than the expected value in return
for coverage. This represents the usual risk premium that an insurance provider can extract due
to the risk aversion of the insured party.
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23Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Equation (3) characterizes the prot of the bad insurer. Setting this equal to
R 
0 dF(), provides
an expression which implicitly denes the zero-prot premium P0
B as a function of r, the return
on premia invested. It is straightforward to show that P0
B becomes arbitrarily small as r becomes
































B(r) is strictly decreasing in r, and limr!1 P0
B = 0. Since the zero prot premium for





B(r) for all r > r.
Proof of Lemma 2
First, consider the case in which the good insurer dominates. The existence of such an equi-
librium can be ensured when the bank's aversion to counterparty risk is high. As Z becomes
arbitrarily large, (1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qB)  P0
G   P0
B must hold, so that the bank prefers the good
insurer at the zero prot premium. The good insurer's optimal premium P
G, is that which satises
(5) with equality, as described in the lemma.
The case in which the bad insurer dominates follows the same logic, but is somewhat more
involved given the simplied framework outlined in Section 2. The bad insurer oers a lower
premium, but higher counterparty risk. Intuitively, it will dominate the market if the added risk is
small relative to the discount on premium it oers. Existence requires
(1   p)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) < P0
G   P0
B: (20)
From the proof to Lemma 1, we can see that P0
B becomes arbitrarily small as r becomes large. Let
this be the case, let Z = 0 and replace qB = 1 F(1) and qG = 1 F(1 P0
G) so that (20) becomes
(1   p)[F(1)   F(1   P0
G)] < P0
G: (21)







which holds since (1   p)=(   ) < 1. Note that  > 1, otherwise the bad insurer would always
default when faced with a claim. The equilibrium premium is the maximum premium for which
(6) is still satised. This is sucient to prove the result, but we note that existence in the case
where the bad insurer dominates can be shown for any F() through a simple generalization of Z.
In Section 2, we assume that when the bank suers a loss and is uninsured, or is insured but the
insurer cannot pay, it suers the cost Z. Implicit in this is that the insurer pays nothing in the event
of a default. This simplication is made to avoid unnecessary complication, and is not vital to our
results. In reality, it would be more common for there to be a recovery value when the underlying
asset of a CDS defaults. This feature can be added to the model with a simple modication to Z.
Let  be the recovery value. We can then dene e Z = Z    and all of the results in the paper
follow through by replacing Z with e Z. In particular, if we rewrite (20) with the general form of Z
described above, we obtain the following.
(1   p)(1 + e Z)(qG   qB) < P0
G   P0
B (23)
Thus, to prove the existence of an equilibrium where the bad insurer dominates we can simply let
Z = 0, and  ! 1, so that e Z !  1 and (23) holds trivially. The intuition is that when there is
almost full recovery, there is little dierence in counterparty risk. Since the bad insurer oers a
lower premium, it is preferred.
Proof of Proposition 2
With no information about insurer type, banks will insure with the provider who oers the
lowest premium (unless the premium is below P0
G). Given this, the insurers will compete on premia
until it falls to P0
G. Below this premium, the bad insurer would be revealed and the good insurer
would drop out of the market. Thus, the equilibrium is characterized as one in which both insurers
oer coverage at the premium P0
G, and the bad insurer earns a positive prot.
With perfect information over insurer type and all insurance provided by the good insurer, the
premium is P
G  P0
G such that (5) holds with equality. The market counterparty risk is then given
by 1   qG = F(1   PG). It follows that,
d(1   qG)
dPG
=  dF(1   PG)  0: (24)
With asymmetric information over insurer type, P
G = P0
G. Thus counterparty risk for the good
insurer is (weakly) higher with asymmetric information. Coupled with the participation of the bad
25insurer, market counterparty risk unambiguously increases.
Proof of Lemma 3
The bank's payo from insuring with the good and bad insurers are given as follows.
(G) = pRB + (1   p)qG   (1   p)(1   qG)Z   PG (25)
(B) = pRB + (1   p)qB   (1   p)(1   qB)Z   PB (26)
We now dene ^ Z as that which equates these expressions.
^ Z =
PG   PB
(1   p)(qG   qB)
  1 (27)
Inserting the zero prot premia yields the expression characterized in Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 3
The result is straightforward in case 1. Given that there is Bertrand competition within each
type of insurer, the premium is always that which earns zero prot. Initially, market counterparty
risk is given by (2  qB  qG)=2, where qB = 1 F(1) and qG = 1 F(1 P0
G). Once the ZL bank
is removed from the market, the bad insurer drops out (by Lemma 3), but the good insurer cannot
alter its premium. Therefore, market counterparty risk is now 1   qG. Since qG is unchanged, and
qG > qB, market counterparty risk decreases.
The second case is less obvious. We begin by dening the initial equilibrium and then charac-
terize the change in market counterparty risk when the ZL bank is removed. Initially, there are two
banks and two insurers. The ZH bank is most attractive to both insurers, as this type is willing to
pay a higher premium for insurance, yet poses no additional risk. Thus, by Lemma 3, we restrict
our attention to the case when the good insurer contracts with ZH and the bad insurer with ZL.
Given this, a unique set of equilibrium premia are determined by the following set of participation
and incentive constraints.
qB(1   p)(1 + ZL)  PB (PCL)
qG(1   p)(1 + ZH)  PG (PCH)
PG   PB  (1   p)(1 + ZL)(qG   qB) (ICL)
PG   PB  (1   p)(1 + ZH)(qG   qB) (ICH)
The Inequality PCL (PCH) ensures that the ZL (ZH) bank will purchase insurance from the bad
(good) insurer, rather than go without. Inequality ICL (ICH) ensures that the ZL (ZH) bank
26contracts with the bad (good) insurer rather than the competitor. Recall that we assume that an
insurer only insures one bank so that a deviating bank is still the only party with whom the new
insurer contracts.21 This could be relaxed to allow multiple contracts per insurer, but would add
undue complication without changing the qualitative results. Expanding ICH, we have
PG  qG(1   p)(1 + ZH)   [qB(1   p)(1 + ZH)   PB]: (28)
The second term on the right hand side is negative since
qB(1   p)(1 + ZH)   PB > qB(1   p)(1 + ZL)   PB  0; (29)
where the second inequality follows from PCL. Thus, (28) shows that PCH is redundant and can
be ignored. Furthermore, in equilibrium, ICH must be satised with equality, otherwise the good
insurer could increase the premium and still attract the ZH bank. This implies
PG   PB = (1   p)(1 + ZH)(qG   qB) > (1   p)(1 + ZL)(qG   qB); (30)
so that ICL can also be ignored. Finally, in equilibrium the bad insurer will increase its premium
until the ZL bank is just indierent to purchasing the contract or not so that PCL is satised with
equality. To summarize, the equilibrium premia in this situation are P
B = qB(1   p)(1 + ZL) and
P
G = (1   p)(qG   qB)(1 + ZH) + P
B.
We now consider the equilibrium when the ZL banks are removed. We know from Lemma 3
that this will drive the bad insurer out of the market. However, this constrains the good insurer by
changing ICH, which determines the premium in equilibrium. As the bad insurer no longer has a
contract, it will oer the lowest premium possible in an attempt to lure the ZH bank, namely P0
B.
Thus, the new premium oered by the good insurer is P




G, the good insurer will become less stable (weakly).
Market counterparty risk in the initial equilibrium is (2 qB qG)=2, where qB and qG are implied
by the premia P
B and P
G dened above. When the ZL bank is removed, market counterparty risk
is simply 1 qG, which is dened by the premium P
G . Since P
G  P
G, and the default risk of the
good insurer is decreasing in the premium, the aect on market counterparty risk is ambiguous.
Using the denition of q and the relevant premia, we can derive the following condition under which
market counterparty increases (as stated in the proposition).
2F(1   P
G ) > F(1   P
G) + F(1) (31)
Clearly, a distribution function can be chosen that will satisfy this condition. In the case where
F() is uniform, condition (31) is simply 2P
G < P
G. Using the expressions for P
G and P
G we
21We make this simplifying assumption for expositional purposes. Since both banks have the same probability of
a claim, the insurer would be indierent between the two for a given premium. Therefore, we assume they choose to
contract with the deviating bank. Allowing each insurer to contract with both banks greatly complicates the payo




G = (1   p)(1 + ZH)(2qG(P
G )   qB   qG(P
G)) + 2P0
B   qB(1   p)(1 + ZL): (32)















B   qB(1   p)(1 + ZL)]
      (1   p)(1 + ZH)
: (34)
Consider the case in which r becomes arbitrarily large, so that P0
B ! 0 as shown in Lemma 1. It
follows that when ZH <
  (1 p)
1 p , then 2P
G < P
G. Note that  > 1 and  < 0 (if  < 1, the bad
insurer would always default when faced with a claim).
Proof of Lemma 4
Since there are eectively four participants in this market, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is
attained when all four have no incentive to change their behavior. The banks choose an insurer
and the insurers optimize payos through their choice of premia. First, we characterize the payo
functions for both types of banks when insuring with both types of insurer.
(S;G) = pSR + (1   pS)qG   (1   pS)(1   qG)Z   PG (35)
(S;B) = pSR + (1   pS)qB   (1   pS)(1   qB)Z   PB (36)
(R;G) = pRR + (1   pR)qG   (1   pR)(1   qG)Z   PG (37)
(R;B) = pRR + (1   pR)qB   (1   pR)(1   qB)Z   PB (38)
We rst set up conditions for each bank type which determine with whom they contract. We then
consider the behavior of the insurers, which is characterized by the premia.
Pooling at the Good Insurer:
Consider rst the case in which the good insurer dominates the market. This will occur when
(S;G)  (S;B) and (R;G)  (R;B), which are characterized as follows.
(1   pS)(1 + Z)(qG   qB)  PG   PB (39)
(1   pR)(1 + Z)(qG   qB)  PG   PB (40)
Should the premia be such that (39) holds, then condition (40) is satised by default. Intuitively,
28these conditions are satised when both bank types care more about counterparty risk (Z) and less
about the dierence in premia between the two insurers. If (39) is satised, the (pooling) beliefs of
the good insurer are dened by bG = (2 pR pS)=2, while the beliefs of the bad insurer are dened
o the equilibrium path. We use o the equilibrium path beliefs for the bad insurer that make this
equilibrium least likely to exist, namely bB = 1   pS. When the good insurer dominates, the bad
insurer will cut its premium as low as it can and is still driven out of the market. Therefore, the
premium the bad insurer charges is P0
B(1   pS), where we write the beliefs of the insurer as an
argument of the premium function in bold to avoid confusion with the multiplication operator. We
now rewrite expression (39) to include beliefs.
(1   pS)(1 + Z)(qG   qB)  PG ((2   pR   pS)=2)   P0
B(1   pS) (41)
The good insurer will maximize prot by setting a premium which just satises (41) with equal-
ity, so that P
G ((2   pR   pS)=2)  P0
G ((2   pR   pS)=2). We simply wish to show exis-
tence, so we look at the limiting case where Z ! 1. In this case, (41) is clearly satised for
P
G ((2   pR   pS)=2) = P0
G ((2   pR   pS)=2). It remains to be determined whether either
insurer has an incentive to change its premium. Given that the bad insurer sets the lowest possible
premium, it only has the possibility of raising its premium. Since no bank contracts with it at
P0
B(1   pS), then no bank will contract with it at a higher premium. Since the good insurer
already appeals to both bank types, it has no incentive to lower its premium. It may however,
want to increase its premium to as high as the risky bank can tolerate, losing the safe bank in the
process. The premium will be set such that (40) holds with equality where PB = P0
B(1   pS).
However, the payos for the banks converge in the limiting case, so that
lim
Z!1
(1   pS)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) = lim
Z!1
(1   pR)(1 + Z)(qG   qB):
Eectively, both bank's payos are dominated by the aversion to counterparty risk and the insurer
has no way of determining bank type. Thus, it cannot extract any extra premium from the risky
bank.
Pooling at the Bad Insurer:
We now consider the case in which the bad insurer dominates the market. This will occur when
(S;G) < (S;B) and (R;G) < (R;B), which are characterized as follows.
(1   pS)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) < PG   PB (42)
(1   pR)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) < PG   PB (43)
Should the premia be such that (43) holds, then condition (42) is satised by default. Intuitively,
these conditions are satised when the banks put little weight on counterparty risk (Z) and are
more driven by the premium. If (43) is satised, the (pooling) beliefs of the good insurer are dened
29by bB = (2   pR   pS)=2, while the beliefs of the bad insurer are dened o the equilibrium path.
We take o equilibrium path beliefs for the good insurer that make this equilibrium least likely
to exist, bG = 1   pS. When the bad insurer dominates, the good insurer charges the premium
P0
G(1   pS) and still does not insure either type. We rewrite expression (43), explicitly specifying
the beliefs.
(1   pR)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) < P0
G(1   pS)   PB ((2   pR   pS)=2) (44)
The bad insurer will maximize prot by setting a premium which just satises (44), so that
P
B ((2   pR   pS)=2)  P0
B ((2   pR   pS)=2). To show existence, we show that (44) holds
when P
B ((2   pR   pS)=2) = P0
B ((2   pR   pS)=2). Similar to Lemma 2, this can be shown
by setting Z = 0 and placing appropriate restrictions on the distribution function F(). Alterna-
tively, as discussed in the proof to Lemma 2, we could analyze the limiting case when the recovery
value  ! 1, so that Z !  1. In this case, (44) is trivially satised.
It remains to be determined whether either insurer has an incentive to change its premium. The
bad insurer is the only one that may have the incentive to do so. It can raise its premium as high
as possible, such that (42) still holds, where P
G = P0
G(1   pS). In this case, it gives up the risky
bank in exchange for a higher premium. As with the previous case of pooling at the good insurer,
we can rule this type of deviation out by considering a limiting case in which the left hand side of
inequalities (42) and (43) converge. A value of Z = 0 is not sucient to attain this however, as the
good insurer may provide a higher expected return for the risky bank even when Z = 0 (when the
banks are risk neutral), as it poses less risk of default. Thus we let Z = 0 and pR ! pS and see that
in the limit, the bad insurer has no means by which to insure only the safe bank. Alternatively,
we can consider the limiting case with a recovery value, in which Z gets arbitrarily close to  1. In
this case, it is easy to see that the left hand side of (42) and (43) both approach 0, so the amount
by which the bad insurer can raise its premium and obtain only the safe bank gets arbitrarily small.
Separating Equilibrium:
A separating equilibrium is most likely to exist when there is a signicant dierence between risky
and safe banks. With this in mind, we prove existence by xing Z and focusing on the limiting
case in which the probability that the safe bank makes a claim is arbitrarily small, so that pS ! 1.
We will then show that a separating equilibrium cannot exist when Z takes extreme values as with
the pooling equilibria discussed above.
In examining this case, it is necessary to be explicit about a bank participation constraint which
imposes a ceiling on the premium. Recall that banks receive the penalty Z if they suer a loss.
It follows that if the premium is too high, they will simply choose not to insure. Using expression
(1), we can determine the premium under which a bank i, potentially insuring with an insurer j,
will be indierent to purchasing the contract.
Pmax
ij = qj(1   pi)(1 + Z) (45)
30From expressions (35)-(38), the following inequalities characterize the conditions that must hold
for a separating equilibrium in which a safe bank insures with the bad insurer, while a risky bank
insures with the good insurer.
(1   pS)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) < PG(1   pR)   PB(1   pS) (46)
(1   pR)(1 + Z)(qG   qB)  PG(1   pR)   PB(1   pS) (47)




G that which satises (47) with equality. Note that when (47) holds
with equality, then (46) must also hold, as pR < pS.
These premia satisfy (46) - (47), so a risky (safe) bank will indeed contract with a good (bad)
insurer. What remains to be shown is that the insurers will not benet from deviating and oering
dierent premia. Consider the bad insurer rst. The premium Pmax
SB , is dened as in expression
(45) so that the safe bank is just indierent to purchasing the contract. If it increases the premium,
it will no longer participate in the market. Alternatively, it may wish to reduce its premium and
insure both bank types. However, in the limiting case where pS ! 1 this will not be optimal
because Pmax
SB is lower than the zero prot pooling premium, Pmax
SB  P0
B(2   pR   pS=2). To see
that this is true, note that as pS ! 1, Pmax
SB ! 0.
Now consider the good insurer. As the good insurer's premium is that which just satises (47)
with equality, it cannot increase the premium or it will lose the risky bank and not participate in
the market. Alternatively, it may wish to lower its premium and take the whole market (pooling
over both types). To do this, P
G must fall until (46) is satised. In the limiting case, the left




B(2 pR  pS=2) < P0
G(2 pR  pS=2). Therefore, such a deviation is not protable and our
candidate is an equilibrium.
Now consider the case in which pS xed. If Z ! 1, (46) and (47) cannot be simultaneously
satised. The same is the case when Z = 0 (with suitable restrictions on the distribution function
F()), or alternatively for Z !  1 when we allow for recovery values. Therefore, separation will
only occur for intermediate values of Z as described in the lemma.
As a nal note, we can see that the separating equilibrium in which the safe (risky) bank insures
with the good (bad) insurer is easily ruled out. Such an equilibrium would require the following.
(1   pS)(1 + Z)(qG   qB)  PG(1   pS)   PB(1   pR)
(1   pR)(1 + Z)(qG   qB) < PG(1   pS)   PB(1   pR)
These expressions cannot be satised simultaneously since 1   pS < 1   pR.
Proof of Proposition 4
31Consider one ZH bank switching from a good to a bad insurer. Default risk of the CCP,
1 qCCP, changes from (1 qG)NG(1 qB)NB to (1 qG)NG 1(1 qB)NB+1. Given the probability
of a claim, (1 p), the cost in terms of increased counterparty risk follows by subtracting these two
numbers. Under Bertrand competition, the benet of insuring with the bad insurer is the dierence
in premium P0
G  P0
B. Thus, if P0
G  P0
B  (1 p)(1 qG)NG 1(1 qB)NB(qG  qB), every ZH will
unilaterally switch to the bad insurer, so that in equilibrium NG = 0.
Appendix B: Formal Analysis of Section 5
We extend the analysis of Section 5 to allow banks to divide their contracts (each of size one)
with as many insurers as they wish, and let there be a countably innite number of good and bad
insurers. As dened previously, each insurer receives an independent portfolio draw from the same
distribution F(). We enrich the modeling of insurer default and allow aggregate risk that aects
bad insurers, but does not aect good insurers. Specically, with probability 1  qA, all of our bad
insurers default at once.22 Therefore, we redene 1   qB = 1   f qBqA, where 1   f qB represents the
idiosyncratic risk of a bad insurer (which can be thought of as the usual counterparty risk of the
bad insurer as in previous sections), and the default risk for a good insurer remains unchanged.
When banks contract with many insurers, it is possible that some default while others do not.
Thus, we redene our cost of default Z as Z(x), where x represents the percentage of a bank's
insurers that fail when a claim is made, and where Z0(x) > 0, Z00(x) > 0 and Z(0) = 0. This
denition of Z implies the following.
Lemma 5 When Z(x) is strictly convex, the bank will insure with as many insurers as possible.
Proof:
Consider the expected prot of a bank that insures a risky asset (that defaults with probability
p), with k identical insurers. Since insurers are identical, we consider the size of each contract, 1=k
and the premium, P as the same across insurers. Prots are characterized as follows.



















Where q (1   q) is the probability that an insurer is solvent (insolvent) in the event of a claim.
We rst show that increasing the number of insurers keeps the payo constant if banks were risk
22This structure is assumed for simplicity. The good insurers could be exposed to aggregate risk, but to a lesser
degree. Furthermore, we could have partially correlated default risk instead of perfectly correlated risk. Neither
simplication aects the qualitative results.
32neutral (i.e., Z(x) = 0 for every x). In step 2 of this proof, we will show that (48) is concave and
so our banks will behave in a risk averse manner and so they will choose the number of insurers
to minimize the variance of their payo. In other words, we show that decreasing the number of
insurers is a mean preserving spread, and so is not desirable to a risk averse bank; a standard result.
We now set up the payo function for the bank when it insures with k and k + 1 insurers (Sk
and Sk+1 respectively). Each term in the sum Sk consists of the claim payed out (k i)=k, less the
cost of counterparty risk Z(i=k) when the fraction i=k insurers default (the result of which may be
negative) weighted by the probability that i=k insurers default. First, note that regardless of the
number of insurers (k), the bank will receive R with probability p and pay the insurance cost P,
so we focus solely on the sum Sk. Expanding the sum (past k = 3) and separating the claims paid
from the cost of default, we have the following.



























































































In step 1 we show that when the bank payo function is linear, i.e., Z() = 0, then Sk = Sk+1.
Step 1
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qk i(1   q)i k + 1
k + 1   i
k + 1   i
k + 1
= q:
Therefore, Sk = Sk+1 so that changing the number of insurers does not change the payo for a
bank with Z() = 0. We now show that when Z() is convex, the bank will prefer more insurers to
33fewer.
Step 2
We wish to appeal to standard results on mean preserving spreads and risk aversion. First, it is
simple to see that adding more insurers decreases the variance of the payo. Intuitively, as more
insurers are added, it makes extreme events (such as every insurer defaulting at the same time)
less likely. To show that our objective function is concave in payo (or wealth as it is traditionally
viewed in standard portfolio theory), we let y = k i
k be the payout from insurers, and so the cost
of default becomes Z(1   y). Ignoring the constant terms, the payo for a xed number of insurer
defaults (dened as U(y)) can be represented as follows.
U(y) = y   Z(1   y) (49)
The derivative with respect to y is
1 + Z0(1   y) > 0: (50)
Where the sign follows because Z0() > 0. Taking and signing the second order condition yields the
following.
 Z00(1   y) < 0 (51)
Where the sign follows because Z00() > 0. Thus, our objective function is concave. Therefore, since
insurance with k insurers is a mean preserving spread of k + 1 insurers, a bank will insure with as
many insurers as possible.
Due to the convexity of Z(), the bank is eectively risk averse. The benet of insuring with
more insurers is that it makes the banks return more predictable by making tail events (e.g., every
insurer defaulting and the bank incurring a cost Z(1)) less likely. The result that a risk averse agent
prefers more predictable returns is then a standard one. Given that there is a countably innite
number of insurers, Lemma 5 tells us that the banks will insure with a continuum of insurers.
We now turn to the main result of the section. The following proposition shows that there exists
a separating equilibrium wherein a risky bank insurers with only good insurers, and a safe bank
insures with only bad insurers.
Proposition 5 There exists a separating equilibrium when the insurance market is non-exclusive.
Proof.
Let the beliefs of the insurers correspond to a separating equilibrium in which the risky bank
insurers with only good insurers, and the safe bank insures with only bad insurers. Since insurers
34are identical, we assume that all good (bad) insurers charge PG (PB). For expositional purposes, we
drop the belief argument on the premia. The payo of the safe bank if it insures with a measure  
of bad insurers and 1   of good insurers is given as follows. Note that we highlight the argument
of Z() in bold to emphasize that Z is now a function.
(S; B;(1    )G) = pSR +  (1   pS)qB + (1    )(1   pS)qG
 (1   pS)(1   qA)Z (  (1   f qB) + (1    )(1   qG))
 (1   pS)qAZ (  + (1    )(1   qG))    PB   (1    )PG
We wish to nd when the safe bank chooses   = 1, i.e., insures exclusively with bad insurers.
This can be assured when (S; B;(1    )G) is strictly increasing in  . Dierentiating our prot
function with respect to   yields the following.
PG   PB
1   pS
> (qG   qB) + (1   qA)(qG   qB)Z0 (  (1   f qB) + (1    )(1   qG))
+qAqGZ0 (  + (1    )(1   qG)) (52)
Since Z00() > 0, the right hand side of (52) is increasing in  . To show existence, we use the value
that makes condition (52) least likely to hold,   = 1.
PG   PB
1   pS
> (qG   qB) + (1   qA)(qG   qB)Z0 (1   f qB) + qAqGZ0 (1) (53)
Repeating a similar exercise for the risky bank, we wish to nd when the payo is decreasing in
 , i.e., the risky bank insures exclusively with good insurers. The condition under which it would
insure with only good insurers is given as follows.
PG   PB
1   pR
< (qG   qB) + (1   qA)(qG   qB)Z0 (  (1   f qB) + (1    )(1   qG))
+qAqGZ0 (  + (1    )(1   qG)) (54)
Since Z00() > 0, the right hand side of (54) is increasing in  . We use the value that makes
condition (54) least likely to hold,   = 0.
PG   PB
1   pR
< (qG   qB) + (1   qA)(qG   qB)Z0 (1   qG) + qAqGZ0 (1   qG) (55)
We now characterize the two equilibrium premia. Given competition within insurer types, an
insurer must charge its zero prot premium, conditional on its beliefs about bank type. Therefore,
in a separating equilibrium, the premia are: PG = P0
G(1   pR) and PB = P0
B(1   pS). To
demonstrate that the separating equilibrium exists, we use the extreme case in which pS ! 1.
Since P0
G(1 pR) > P0
B(1 pS), it follows that (53) is satised and (55) is satised for some nite
Z0 (1   qG).
35We are left with determining whether any insurers (or positive measure of insurers) would like
to change its premium. It is straightforward to see that the premium cannot increase since that
insurer would be removed from the market. Next, if a bad insurer cut its premium in an attempt to
gain the risky type, it will make negative prot since it is currently charging its zero prot premium
given the safe bank. If it was to insure the risky type as well, it would require a higher premium
to break even (i.e., the break-even pooling premium). Next, consider a good insurer who cuts its
premium to gain the safe bank in addition to the risky bank. As pS ! 1, (53) implies that it must
reduce its premium to PG  P0
B(1   pS). In this case it would earn negative prot since Lemma
1 implies that P0
G(1   pS)  P0
B(1   pS) and we know that P0
G(1   pS) < P0
G(2   pR   pS=2).
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Each bank type holds an innitesimally small
amount with each insurer. There exists a parameter range in which the safe bank insures with the
full set of bad insurers, and no good insurers. Conversely, the risky bank insures with the full set
of good insurers, and no bad insurers. Banks do not insurer with both insurer types in this case
because uncertainty with bad insurers cannot be eliminated because of the aggregate risk. The
risky bank prefers to insure with only good insurers to avoid this uncertainty, whereas the safe
bank prefers the lower premium at the bad insurers.
In the separating equilibrium, our banks insure with one type of insurer, even though each was
permitted to split its contract over insurer type. We can go even further than this in addressing
contract non-exclusivity. Although we have not explicitly modeled it here, this equilibrium can still
exist with a formal choice of contract size by the banks. Although the banks can attain certainty
by insuring with an innite number of good insurers, they cannot attain this with the bad insurers.
If they were able to attain certainty by insuring with an innite number of bad insurers, then they
could replicate the protection that good insurers provide by simply increasing the contract size
with bad insurers. However, in the state of the world in which all bad insurers fail due to aggregate
risk, a larger contract size with bad insurers will not increase the payout. Therefore, banks cannot
replicate good insurance from the bad insurers so that the risky bank prefers to pay the extra
premium to insure with the good insurers.
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